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I. INTRODUCTION

Employers are now turning in increasing numbers to Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMO") and Preferred Provider Organizations
("PPO") to deliver health insurance benefits to their employees. The
organizations provide savings to both the worker and the business owner.
As with the traditional role of physicians, however, concerns have been
raised regarding liability arising from the administration, implementation,
and operation of HMOs throughout the United States. Courts have seen
cases where parties have sought to impose liability against HMOs for
malpractice based upon an HMO's member physicians with respect to
services provided to members, quality assurance programs related to the
HMOs, and the cost-containment mechanisms common to HMOs.
Courts (as well as legislatures) are now faced with issues presented in
heretofore uncharted waters of HMO liability in the context of medical
malpractice actions. The Plaintiffs' Bar has sought to graft theories of
* Senior Litigation Associate with Gobelman & Love in Jacksonville, Florida. B.A.,
University of Florida, 1984; J.D., Cumberland School of Law, Samford University, 1988.
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liability asserted in traditional malpractice cases in the context of an HMO
liability action. The Defense Bar has, in turn, developed several defenses,
the most significant of which is the application of the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act. This article will briefly explain the
structure of the HMO, outline the theories of liability used most commonly
by plaintiff lawyers, and explore in detail the ERISA defense which is
currently being asserted with varying degrees of success in the federal and
state courts of the United States.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF HMOs
In the context of health care, the HMO systems are generally categorized into several basic structures: the staff model HMO; the Indorsement
Practice Association ("IPA"); and the group model. The staff model HMO
employs its own physicians who receive their salaries directly from the
HMO. The IPA model usually is made up of an association of physicians
which contracts separately with the HMO to provide medical services to the
organization's members. The IPA, in turn, contracts with physicians who
agree to provide health care to HMO members. The IPA physicians also
treat patients who are not enrolled under an HMO plan. The group model
HMO provides prepaid services to members who usually enroll either at
work (through their employers) or through individual medical provider
groups.
In addition to the three HMO models, there also exists what is known
as the PPO. A PPO brings together physicians, hospitals, and other medical
service providers to give discounted services to a specific patient group. A
PPO subscriber will usually pay a premium to the organization. This
organization then pays the providers for the services which were rendered.
The benefits of belonging to a PPO include deductibles which may be lower
than those found in traditional HMOs, additional levels of benefits, and
other protections.
III. THE THEORIES OF LIABILITY
Claims seeking to establish HMO liability for injuries arising from
medical malpractice are usually classified into two main theories: vicarious
liability and direct liability.
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A. Vicarious Liability
Vicarious liability is a theory of liability which is made up of several
sub-theories: respondeat superior, ostensible/apparent agency, and nondelegable duty.
1. Respondeat Superior
Respondeat superior is the type of theory commonly alleged in cases
against doctors in a malpractice setting. In certain instances, an HMO was
held liable based upon this doctrine; in fact, this theory is considered the
substantive bedrock for an HMO-based malpractice action. Courts have
ruled in favor of HMO liability for physician negligence based on a
respondeat superior theory.' In the cases where it was found that an HMO
could be held liable for the malpractice of provider physicians, the courts
focused on the degree of control exercised over the negligent physician and
the identity of the person directly responsible for supervising the physician.
An HMO is more likely to be held liable where the supervising
individual is a medical professional rather than a lay person. For example,
in Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, Inc.,' the court found liability
against an HMO based upon respondeat superior. The court reasoned that
the HMO's staff physicians were under the control of the HMO medical
director (a physician), who supervised medical services and established
policy.3 Relevant to the Sloan decision was a state statute entitled the
Professional Corporation Act of 1983 which detailed the elements of
vicarious liability of a corporation. The court stated that it saw "no reason
why [the HMO] should be exempt from the doctrine of respondeat superior
while professional corporations are not." The court held that "where the
usual requisites of agency or an employer-employee relationship exists, a
corporation may be held vicariously liable for malpractice for the acts of its
employee-physicians." 5

1. Lighterman v. Porter, 548 So. 2d 891, 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Variety
Children's Hosp., Inc. v. Perkins, 382 So. 2d 331, 335 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
2. 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
3. Id. at 1105. In Sloan, the members of the HMO paid a monthly charge in return for
certain enumerated medical services. The member would choose one physician, who
essentially served the role of the personal physician, directing care and referring the member
to other health providers. Id.
4. Id. at 1109.
5. Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 1995

3

Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 7

1050

Nova Law Review

Vol. 19

The federal courts have likewise applied respondeat superior in the
context of a malpractice action. In Schleier v. Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc.,6 the court found liability based upon
respondeat superior where the physician "acted neither on his own initiative
nor independently of the [HMO] physician" but merely made recommendations to the HMO's physicians."
Neither the Sloan court nor the Schleier court specified the degree or
manner of control necessary to find vicarious liability. The Schleier court,
however, noted that the power to control a servant's conduct was the only
controlling factor in its test for determining whether the requisite "masterservant" relationship existed.' Both the Schleier and Sloan courts found
that a degree of evidence of control may be enough to find vicarious
liability.
Other state courts have held likewise. In Florida, an appellate court
held that "it is the right of control, and not actualcontrol, which determines
the relationship between the parties."9
Therefore, evidence of actual
control over the physician is not necessary to establish that an employer/employee relationship exists. Rather, it must be shown that the HMO is
in a position to control the physician to establish the requisite relationship
for respondeat superior.
2. Ostensible/Apparent Agency
In the absence of an actual employment relationship, apparent/
ostensible agency (or agency by estoppel) may be used as a theory of
liability. While the two theories have distinct and separate elements, the
courts have not necessarily drawn a clear distinction between the two."0
Apparent agency is divided into three elements: a representation by the
principal; reliance on the representation by a third person; and a change of
position by the third person in reliance upon such representation to his
detriment."1

6. 876 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
7. Id. at 178
8. Id. at 177.
9. Nazworth v. Swire Fla., Inc., 486 So. 2d 637, 638 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(citations omitted).
10. See, e.g., Tampa Sand & Material Co. v. Davis, 125 So. 2d 126, 127 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1960) (referring to actual authority and ostensible authority as two theories of
liability, but not discussing estoppel).
11. See Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. Robbins, 433 So. 2d 491, 494 (Fla. 1983)
(approving Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
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The elements of ostensible agency are found in section 429 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, "Negligence in Doing Work Which Is
Accepted in Reliance on the Employer's Doing the Work Himself:"
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for
another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are
being rendered by the employer or by his servants, is subject to liability
for physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in
supplying such services, to the same extent as though the employer were
supplying them himself or by his servants.' 2
The elements of ostensible agency in the physician/HMO relationship are:
whether the patient looks to the institution, rather than the individual
physician for medical care; and whether the hospital or HMO holds out the
physician as its employee. Numerous cases have been decided under this
theory. In Florida, one court held that a hospital would be liable for a
physician's negligence where the hospital "holds out" the physician as its
employee and the patient accepts treatment from the physician "in the
reasonable belief that it is being rendered in behalf of the hospital."' 3
The leading case on ostensible agency in the HMO context is Boyd v.
Albert Einstein Medical Center.'4 In Boyd, the decedent and her husband
were HMO participants. Upon enrolling, the decedent was given a directory
listing the participating physicians. Restricted to this list, the decedent chose
two primary care physicians. She contacted one of the doctors for
treatment; he referred her to a surgeon who was also a participating HMO
physician. The treatment provided by the surgeon ultimately led to her
death. In the complaint it was alleged that the HMO physicians were
represented to be competent, and that the decedent relied upon these
representations.
In Boyd, the court set out the factors of ostensible agency as: "(1)
whether the patient looks to the institution, rather than the individual
physician for care, and (2) whether the HMO 'holds out' the physician as

1981), and setting forth the three elements in the context of a tort action, not a medical
malpractice action).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 429 (1965).

13. Irving v. Doctors Hosp. Inc., 415 So. 2d 55, 59 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982). The
court referred to the theory of liability as "apparent authority," but not as ostensible agency,
calling it "an admixture of the agency doctrine of apparent authority and the doctrine of
estoppel." Id at 57.
14. 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
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its employee."' 5 The court then looked to the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, rather than to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for further elucidation on ostensible agency. 16 The Boyd court expanded the ostensible
agency theory in the hospital/physician setting to the HMO/physician
relationship on the rationale that the changing role of health care providers
in recent years justified the extension.' 7
Several facts are central to an understanding of Boyd and its holding:
the HMO covenanted to provide health care to protect and promote the
health of its members; the HMO operated on a direct service rather than on
an indemnity basis; doctor's fees were paid to the HMO, not to the physician; the HMO provided a list from which patients had to choose their
primary care physician; primary care physicians were screened and regulated
by the HMO; a primary physician's referral was required in order to see a
specialist; and patients had no choice as to the specialist.' The court held
that these factors created the inference that the patient looked to the HMO
for care, and not solely to the physicians. 9
3. Nondelegable Duty
The nondelegable duty theory of liability has been utilized in actions
against the HMO. Generally, courts follow the rule of law that a principal
is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor. An exception
arises, however, where it is determined that the principal owes a nondelegable duty to another party regardless of who else undertakes such duty.
The law of the nondelegable duty was recognized in Florida in Mills
v. Krauss.2" The Mills court stated that "[i]n some circumstances duties
may devolve upon an employer which he cannot delegate to another, and in
such cases the employer is liable for breach or non-performance of such
duties even though he employs an- independent contractor to do the
work."'" Once the duty is established, the employer will be held liable for
an employee's negligence as a matter of law.

15. Id. at 1234.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1235.
19. Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1235. Agency by estoppel is more difficult to prove than
ostensible agency because one must show detriment or reliance upon the representation made
by the principal. Under an ostensible agency theory, there is no need to show detrimental
reliance on the principal's conduct in "holding out" the agent as its employee.
20. 114 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
21. Id. at 819.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss3/7

6

Zamora: Medical Malpractice and Health Maintenance Organizations: Evolvin

1995]

Zamora

1053

In Irving v. Doctors Hospital of Lake Worth, Inc.,22 the plaintiffs
filed a negligence claim against an emergency room physician. The court
held that it was error not to instruct the jury that a party may not escape its
contractual liability by delegating performance under the contract to an
independent contractor.' The court, noting that Mills involved an express
contract, stated that the same nondelegable duty rests with a hospital in the
implied contractual relationship between a hospital and an emergency room
patient.24 Therefore, a hospital does not absolve itself of the duty to
provide nonnegligent care to emergency room patients by contracting with
a physician to provide medical treatment. The Irving case is instructive
because the hospital/emergency room physician-patient relationship is
analogous to that of the HMO physician-patient.25
B. Direct Liability
Plaintiffs seek to hold the HMO directly liable for negligent behavior
through application of direct liability. The main theories of direct liability
are the corporate negligence doctrine and liability arising from costcontainment systems. Corporate negligence is then further divided into
negligent selection/retention and negligent supervision or control.
1. Corporate Negligence
The doctrine of corporate negligence in the context of hospitals was
26
first introduced in Darlingv. CharlestonCommunity Memorial Hospital.
In Darling,the court found liability when the defendant hospital failed to
properly review the patient's treatment and require proper consultation.27
The court established that a hospital had an independent responsibility to
patients to supervise the medical treatment provided by medical staff.28
Liability was found as to the hospital's own negligence, not that of the
physician.

22. 415 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
23. Id. at 59.
24. Id. at 60.
25. See William A. Chittenden III, MalpracticeLiability and Managed Health Care:
History and Prognosis,26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451, 461 (1991).
26. 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
27. Id.
28. Id at 260-61.
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In Pedroza v. Bryant,3" the Washington Supreme Court traced the
history of the corporate negligence doctrine concisely, and explained its
operation and effect in plain terms.
The Pedroza court noted that the
doctrine has been used to require a hospital to exercise reasonable care to
insure that those physicians selected as part of the hospital's medical staff
are competent.3 The court viewed the corporate negligence doctrine as a
theory separate and apart from others because of the "increased public
reliance upon hospitals."32 Faced with the duty that a hospital independently owes to a patient, the court then defined the standard of care as the
degree of care of an average, competent hospital acting in the same or
similar circumstances.33
The seminal case on corporate negligence in Florida is Insinga v.
LaBella.34 Insinga involved a hospital which had admitted a man impersonating a doctor (under the name of Dr. LaBella) to its medical staff with
full privileges. While on the staff, LaBella admitted plaintiff's wife to the
hospital where she died nearly three weeks later.35 The Supreme Court of
Florida adopted the corporate negligence doctrine and held that hospitals
"have an independent duty to select and retain competent independent
physicians seeking staff privileges., 36 The court, citing Pedroza, reasoned
that hospitals are in the best position to protect their patients. 37 The public
policy supporting the decision was phrased by the Insinga court as "the
present day view that a hospital is a multifaceted health care facility that
should be responsible for proper medical treatment on its premises.' 3s
Elaborating further, the court opined that the "hospital is in a superior
position to supervise and monitor physician performance and is, consequent'39
ly, the only entity that can realistically provide quality control.
Insingaencompassed both negligent supervision/control and negligent
selection/retention. Negligent selection or retention requires proof of two
concurrent negligent acts, the negligent selection or retention of the

30. 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984).
31. Id. at 168; see alsoElam v. College Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Ct. App. 1982);
Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 189 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. 1972).
32. Pedroza,677 P.2d at 169. The Pedrozacourt noted that the role of the hospital is
changing rapidly and is becoming that of a community health center.
33. Id. at 170.
34. 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989).
35. Id. at 210.
36. Id. at 214.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Insinga, 543 So. 2d at 214.
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physician and the physician's malpractice." The plaintiff must also show
that the negligent selection or retention proximately caused the injury."
Negligent supervision or control arises "when the hospital fails to detect
physician incompetence or to take steps to correct the problems upon
learning of information raising concerns of patient risk.""2 Once again, by
analogizing the relationship between the hospital and the emergency room
to the relationship between the physician and patient, a plaintiff may be able
to apply the doctrine to an HMO."3
2. Cost-Containment Systems
Courts have also recognized the potential for liability stemming from
the negligent implementation of a cost-containment system used by the
HMO to pay for medical services provided'to its members. In a costcontainment system medical services are reviewed prior to being provided
in order to determine whether a less expensive treatment is available which
would accomplish the same purpose." In order to contain costs, employers
turn to a PPO or HMO to furnish health care. Because of the emphasis on
prospective cost containment, the HMO's involvement in a potential
malpractice situation arises. An adverse determination of whether to pay for
a service may result in a claim that a patient did not receive the needed
medical help.
A cost-containment system was first implicated in Pulvers v. Kaiser
FoundationHealth Plan."5 In Pulvers, the doctors were part of a health
care plan which provided incentives to refrain from unnecessary tests and
treatments. The plaintiff brought suit alleging that a death was caused by
a physician's malpractice resulting from the doctor's failure to conduct
proper treatment. The court noted that incentive plans were required by

40. Chittenden, supra note 25, at 472.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Other states have also followed the corporate negligence doctrine. See, e.g., Tucson
Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Misevch, 545 P.2d 958, 960 (Ariz. 1976); Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 160;
Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 236 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Raschel v. Rish, 488
N.Y.S.2d 923, 924 (App. Div. 1985); Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 301
N.W.2d 156, 164 (Wis. 1981).
44. See Robert C. Macaulay, Health Care Cost Containment and MedicalMalpractice:
On a Collision Course, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 91 (1987) (detailing the various control

costs).
45. 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Ct. App. 1979).
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federal statutes and supported by public policy.46 The court also intimated
that in order for liability to attach, the treating physicians would have to
refrain from ordering tests or treatments which the accepted standards of the
medical profession would require in order to receive certain incentives.47
The litmus test for liability resulting from cost-containment programs
was explained in Wickline v. State.48 In Wickline, no liability was attached
because the third party payor did not override the treating physician's
medical judgment.4 9 The court addressed the responsibility of a third party
payor (the State of California) for harm suffered by a patient under a costcontainment program. The court stated that "[t]hird party payors of health
care services can be held legally accountable when medically inappropriate
decisions result from defects in the design or implementation of cost
containment mechanisms."50 The Wickline court went on to say that a
doctor "cannot avoid [the] ultimate responsibility for his patient's care"
when he "complies without protest with the limitations imposed by a third
party payor, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise.'5
IV. A DEFENSE BASED UPON ERISA
As plaintiffs throughout the United States have expanded the medical
malpractice horizon to include actions against HMOs, so too have new
defenses been asserted. Of particular interest and significance is a defense
based upon the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA")5 2 The successful application of ERISA effectively serves to
eviscerate a malpractice action, because it eliminates any chance for a jury
to consider the alleged wrongdoing and substantially narrows the recoverable
damages, excluding pain and suffering as well as other consequential
damages.

46. Id. at 394. The court did, however, rule that no malpractice was committed.
47. Id.
48. 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Ct. App. 1986).
49. Id. at 671. The same court, however, in Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876,
882-83 (Ct. App. 1990), dismissed a motion for summary judgment on a similar fact pattern
based on the treating physician's testimony that the patient was dismissed because of a lack
of funds to pay for a longer hospital stay. See also DeGenova v. Ansel, 555 A.2d 147 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988) (remanding the trial court's dismissal of a suit based on the negligence of
a reviewing physician when the plaintiff sought a mandatory second opinion prior to
accepting health services).
50. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
51. Id. at 671.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
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ERISA5 3 was promulgated subsequent to the rapid rise of employee
benefit plans used to provide health, medical, and pension-related services
to employees throughout the United States.5 The purpose of the ERISA
statute is to protect the interests of participants in the plan by requiring
disclosure of plan specifics and by establishing standards of responsibility
and conduct, as well as providing access to the federal court system.5 ' As
a result, "ERISA comprehensively regulates ... employee welfare benefit
plans that, 'through the purchase of insurance' provide medical, surgical, or
56
hospital care, or benefits in the event of sickness, disability, or death.,
ERISA's application to a dispute is significant because of its myriad of
procedural requirements, the federal law's incorporation of trust law
principles, and its elimination of the right to proceed with a jury trial.
The statute is implicated when a dispute arises which involves an
employee benefit plan. As a result, most state laws and state law related
claims are preempted by the terms of the statute. The preemptive effects are
found in three statutory provisions.5 7 ERISA provides for preemption if
a state law relates to an employee benefit plan; 58 the saving clause excepts
from the preemption clause laws that regulate insurance; 59 and the deemer
clause makes clear that a state law that purports to regulate insurance cannot
deem an employee benefit plan to be an insurance company.6
How then does ERISA impact a malpractice action brought against an
HMO? A Louisiana case provides an explanation. In Rollo v. Maxicare,
Inc.,6 the plaintiff was injured in an accident and his dispute centered
upon the subsequent medical treatment he received. 2
The court began by explaining that a threshold issue in a case which
may implicate ERISA is whether the case involves a plan of the type

53. The statute sets out the congressional declaration of policy, id. § 1001(a)-(c), and
sets forth regulatory provisions, id. §§ 1021-1030, among other things. ERISA has been
called a "symbol of unnecessarily complex government regulation." Id. § 1001 (quoting
President Jimmy Carter in a message to Congress).

54. Id. § 1001(a).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a), (b) (1988).
56. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeux, 481 U.S. 41, 44 (1987) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)

(1982)).
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), (b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(B) (1988).
Id. § 1144.
Id. § I144(b)(1)(A).
Id.
695 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. La. 1988).
Id. at 246.
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contemplated by ERISA.63 As noted, ERISA makes reference to a welfare
benefit plan, which is "any employer program ... which provides medical,
surgical or other hospital benefits in the event of sickness, accident or
disability."64 Notably, as in Rollo, a welfare benefit plan is typically
involved in a medical malpractice case brought against an HMO. Thus, a
cause of action involving such a plan should immediately raise a red flag as
to ERISA's application. Once it is determined that the relevant plan is of
the type contemplated by ERISA, one must look to ERISA's statutory
language to determine whether the damages claim is preempted. The import
of the application of ERISA is that damages are very limited. Therefore,
the usual damages associated with a medical malpractice action are not
generally recoverable.
In a traditional medical malpractice action an aggrieved plaintiff may
seek, and a jury may award, economic damages such as past and future
wage loss, and compensatory damages such as past and future medical
expenses, including costs associated with life care plans. Further, noneconomic damages based upon pain and suffering or emotional distress
visited upon the plaintiff may be sought. A derivative claim sounding in
consortium may also be made by the spouse of the injured plaintiff.
ERISA, however, limits or eliminates extra-contractual damages. A
number of circuit courts of appeal have held that no extra-contractual money
damages may be awarded. 5 Notably, courts adhere to the statutory
language that requires preemption of state-promulgated extra-contractual
damages that may seek to circumvent ERISA's dictates.66
A decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also explains the effect
of ERISA on a medical malpractice action. In Corcoran v. United
Healthcare, Inc.,67 the plaintiffs filed a wrongful death action against
United Healthcare, Inc. and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama ("Blue
Cross"), alleging that their unborn child died as a result of various acts of
negligence in the administration of an employee plan from which the
plaintiffs sought medical treatment for their unborn child.68 The issue
before the court was "whether ERISA pre-empts [sic] a state-law malprac-

63. Id. at 247.
64. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l) (1982)).
65. Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 909 (1988); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1986).
66. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1324.
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tice action brought by the beneficiary of an ERISA plan against a company
that provides 'utilization review' services to the plan."69
In analyzing the nature of the claims, the Fifth Circuit noted that the
plaintiffs alleged that Blue Cross wrongfully denied appropriate medical care
and failed to oversee the medical decisions adequately.7" Notwithstanding
the state law basis of the claims, the court held that ERISA governs.
ERISA contains three provisions addressing preemption: the preemptive clause, the saving clause, and the deemer clause.'
Quoting the
Supreme Court, the Rollo court summarized the effects of the three clauses
as follows: "'If a state law 'relate[s] to ... employee benefit plan[s],' it is
pre-empted [sic].... The saving clause excepts from the preemption clause
laws that 'regulat[e] insurance.' . . . The deemer clause makes clear that a
state law that 'purport[s] to regulate insurance' cannot deem an employee
benefit plan to be an insurance company."' 72 Congress intended the
preemptive clause, and thus the language "relate to," to be broadly
interpreted. 3 In determining whether the claim relates to the plan, one
must examine the nature of the claim. Claims for personal injury, whether
physical or nonphysical, resulting from design or implementation of costcontainment or claims handling systems are typically preempted by ERISA
because they are based on the HMO's administration of the plan.74 Claims
for personal injuries resulting from provider malpractice, however, may
withstand preemption because the connection between claims such as
medical malpractice and employee benefits plans do not relate to administration. Such claims may be deemed too tenuous, remote, or peripheral to
warrant preemption. The saving clause relates to the regulation of
insurance.75 Under the clause, "the state law at issue must be said to
directly regulate insurance."7' 6 The scope of the saving clause is accordingly very narrow. It is not enough that the relevant state law have some
application in an insurance context or generally impact on the business of
insurance.

69. Id. at 1322.
70. Id. at 1326.
71. Rollo, 695 F. Supp. at 247 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), (b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(B)

(1982)).
72. Id. at 247-48 (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 44-45 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144

(1974))).
73. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47.
74. Chittenden, supra note 25, at 487-88.

75. 29 U.S.C. § l144(b)(2)(A) (1988).
76. Rollo, 695 F. Supp. at 248.
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Section 1132(a) of ERISA provides for civil remedies. Outside of
these listed remedies, legislative policy dictates that no other actions shall
be maintained against an ERISA plan." Therefore, the analysis that a
plaintiff is entitled to a remedy because preemption would leave him or her
without a remedy is improper.78 The claim simply must be one included
under section 1132(a) of ERISA.
Essentially, the determination of preemption of a claim depends upon
the claim's relation to the plan at issue. In Independence HMO, Inc. v.
Smith,79 the court held that Smith's state court medical malpractice claim
was not preempted by ERISA because of the claim's relation to the welfare
benefit plan.8 Smith sued Independence HMO on a theory of ostensible
agency. The court reasoned that the state law based tort action did not
impact upon the employee benefit plan or affect the congressional scheme
in the ERISA statute, and therefore was not preempted.8 ' Additionally, the
court held that the plan's grievance procedure could not, by virtue of its
design, adequately redress state tort claims against Independence HMO. 82
The court also held that Smith had no obligation to exhaust the available
remedies under the plan before filing suit. 3 The court reasoned that
Smith's state tort action sought a remedy that did not arise under ERISA
and the action did "not depend upon her contractual entitlement to health
plan benefits."84 The court cited Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency &
Service, Inc., 5 for support of its position that the claim was not preempted.86 The Mackey court stated that ERISA plans may be sued for run-ofthe-mill state law claims such as torts committed by an ERISA plan.87
Thus, under the Independence HMO rationale, not all claims involving
ERISA plans would be preempted.

77. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54.
78. See Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1338-39; see also DeGenova, 555 A.2d at 150 (holding
that the action was only remotely related to ERISA and thus not preempted).
79. 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
80. Id. at 989; see also Elsesser v. Hospital of the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic
Medicine, Parkview Div., 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that claims of
state medical malpractice actions are not preempted by ERISA).
81. Independence HMO, 733 F. Supp. at 988.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
86. Independence HMO, 733 F. Supp. at 989.
87. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 833.
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In contrast to Smith, the Fifth Circuit held that certain state law causes
of action are preempted by ERISA.88 In Corcoran,the court held that a
tort claim based upon a wrongful death cause of action was preempted.89
The court concluded that even though the provider made medical decisions
and gave medical advice, it did so for the purpose of making a determination about the availability of benefits under the plan. 90 The court found
that the claim was preempted by the Pilot Life principle found that ERISA
preempts state law claims which allege that benefit claims were improperly
handled. 9 ' The Corcoran court also stated that allowing such a suit to
proceed could contravene Congress's policy of providing a uniform body of
law relating to benefit plans. 92
The Corcoran court distinguished its case from Independence HMO,
Inc. v. Smith.93 The court stated that Independence HMO involved the
medical decisions of a doctor made in the course of treatment, whereas
Corcoran involved a medical decision made in connection with a costcontainment feature of a plan.94 Although the court found it "troubling"
to hold that the plaintiffs had no available remedy, it stressed that the
statutory scheme of ERISA demanded such a holding.95 Any hope for a
remedy in similar cases must be created by a congressional amendment to
the ERISA legislation.96
V. CONCLUSION
The states whose courts have developed the greatest amount of case
law on HMO liability are California, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana.
California has opened the door to HMO liability for the negligent design or
negligent implementation of cost-containment systems. The California
courts have implied a willingness to hold HMOs liable when cost limitation
programs corrupt medical judgment. For example, a plaintiff would stand

88. Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1339.

89. Id. at 1331; see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987)
(holding that in ERISA cases, preemption defense provides sufficient basis for removal to
federal court, notwithstanding the "well-pleaded" complaint doctrine).
90. Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1331.

91. Id. at 1332; see alsoElsesser,802 F. Supp. at 1291 (holding that claims of negligent
refusal to pay benefits are preempted by ERISA).
92. Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1332.

93. Id. at 1333 n.16.

94. Id.
95. Id. at 1338.

96. Id. at 1339.
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a good chance of recovering from an HMO if the plan suggested the
provider physician refrain from ordering medical tests or treatment required
by the accepted standards of the profession. Furthermore, California courts
have also recognized the potential for liability where the HMO overrides the
judgment of a plaintiff's treating physician to deny funding for diagnostic
tests or for an extended hospital stay. The Pennsylvania courts are also
developing HMO law which is decidedly pro-plaintiff. The Superior Court
of Pennsylvania has held that a physician may be the ostensible agent of an
HMO. Pennsylvania has also been hesitant to preempt claims under ERISA.
While it is generally agreed among courts that claims involving the
administration of a plan are preempted, courts in different states differ as to
the reach of the ERISA preemption. For example, Pennsylvania courts have
held that ERISA does not preempt medical malpractice claims. Pennsylvania has also expressed a willingness to allow a claim for personal injuries
when a remedy for the injury is not provided by ERISA. Allowing such
claims is a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court cases addressing ERISA
preemption.
Louisiana courts, on the other hand, have been more restrictive than the
Pennsylvania courts in allowing claims where an ERISA plan is at issue.
Louisiana courts have held ERISA preempts state medical malpractice and
other state law tort claims. The Louisiana courts have noted that where
Congress has explicitly exempted an area of state law, e.g., insurance, there
is no reason to imply exemptions in areas which Congress did not specifically address. Had Congress intended to create further exemptions it could
have drafted such exceptions into the legislation. Therefore, the Louisiana
courts have stated that if a claim would interfere with ERISA's "carefully
constructed scheme of legislation" then it should be preempted. It does not
matter that preemption would leave the plaintiff without a remedy. The
Louisiana courts have stated their preference for disallowing state law claims
relating to ERISA plans, true to Congress's intent, thereby deferring to
Congress in the fashioning of remedies under ERISA. Accordingly, it is
relatively difficult to recover for a claim in which a welfare benefit plan is
at issue in Louisiana.
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